Introduction
One evening, when I was fourteen years old, I was writing an email to a friend. I heard my dad walking towards my room, so I minimized the screen. Although I did not have anything to hide, this is something I always did. This time, however, he asked to see what I was writing. 'Nothing,' I replied. He insisted, so I gave in. After reading my email, he walked away, with his head high, like he had just accomplished something. I felt very angry and violated, even if the actual harm seemed trivial at the time.
2 But the truth is that what appears to be an insignificant harm, in fact, violates our principles and causes us moral and conceptual damage. 3 Now, picture having someone reading your emails and listening to your phone conversations -all without your permission or knowledge. That is precisely what is happening in America today. 4 This Comment examines the legal history of wiretapping and the debate on whether the President has the legal authority to authorize the NSA to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance of Americans, inside the United States. First, this Comment considers the history of wiretapping and the development of wiretapping laws, including the role of the President, Congress, and the Supreme Court in shaping those laws. Second, this Comment studies the birth and statutory framework of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA). 5 Third, this Comment disputes the President's constitutional authority to direct the NSA to conduct warrantless one of the assistant attorney generals. 18 And a considerable debate over the application of the Fourth Amendment 19 to electronic surveillance started. 20
Constitutional permission and statutory restriction
Addressing the issue of wiretapping for the first time, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, refused to extend Fourth Amendment protection to warrantless wiretapping unless a trespassory, physical intrusion was involved. 21 Rejecting an 'enlarged and unusual meaning to the Fourth Amendment', the Court reasoned that Congress, not the Court, is more suited to 'protect the secrecy of telephone messages'. 22 However, Justice Brandeis, in his famous dissent, noted that the Fourth Amendment gives us 'the right to be let alone --the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men', 23 And he cautioned that the majority's decision did not take into consideration scientific and technological advances that would someday become very intrusive. 24 This decision gave the president a green light to conduct warrantless wiretapping while inviting Congress to regulate it. As a result, Congress began controlling electronic surveillance by prohibiting funds for wiretaps used to enforce prohibition laws. 25 Soon thereafter, it passed the Federal Communications Act of 1934 26 that prohibited the unauthorized interception of 'any wire or radio communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communications to any person …'. Court is undoubtedly sound both in regard to the use of evidence secured over tapped wires in the prosecution of citizens in criminal cases; and is also right in its opinion that under ordinary and normal circumstances wire-tapping by Government agents should not be carried on for the excellent reason that it is almost bound to lead to abuse of civil rights. However, I am convinced that the Supreme Court never intended any dictum in the particular case which it decided to apply to grave matters involving the defense of the nation . . . You are, therefore, authorized and directed in such cases as you may approve, after investigation of the need in each case, to authorize the necessary investigation agents that they are at liberty to secure information by listening devices . . . You are requested furthermore to limit these investigations so conducted to a minimum and to limit them insofar as possible to aliens. Ibid. 
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The Department of Justice (DOJ) construed the Communications Act as not one that outlawed interception; rather, according to the DOJ's view, three elements had to be met before the law is violated:
1. the government engages in prohibited interception; 2. it discloses any information obtained by means of that interception; and 3. the disclosure is to someone outside of the Executive Branch.
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That type of understanding of the Communications Act left the President free to wiretap. As expected, the Supreme Court, in Nardone v. United States, 29 stepped in three years later to interpret the language of Section 3. 30 The Court held that the Communications Act outlawed electronic surveillance of telephone conversation, and it prohibited the admission of evidence obtained using wiretaps. 31 Two years later, the Court went further, in Nardone II, 32 and it extended the exclusionary rule to any evidence derived from the knowledge gained by intercepting communications in violation of the Act.
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In response, the Roosevelt Administration amended the DOJ policies to comply with Nordeen; 34 however, it authorized electronic surveillance in the context of national security, limiting it 'insofar as possible, to aliens'. 35 Extending this authorization by eliminating the 'alien' requirement, President Harry Truman directed his attorney general to allow electronic surveillance in cases that significantly threatened domestic security. 36 Responding to the President, Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947 37 that divided the executive branch's role between foreign affairs and domestic affairs. 48 The Court held that the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when FBI agents attached an electronic listening and recording device, without a warrant, in a public telephone booth from where the defendant made phone calls. 49 However, the Court reserved a judgment on the application of its holding to matters of national security. 50 Nevertheless, Justice White, in his concurring opinion, concluded that if the President of the United States or the attorney general has determined electronic surveillance as reasonable and authorized such surveillance, a judicial sanctioned warrant is not necessary. 51 On the other hand, Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan, in their concurring opinion, rejected the notion that the President is capable of serving as an 'adversary-and-prosecutor and disinterested, neutral magistrate' all at the same time, hence requiring the president to comply with the warrant provisions of the Fourth Amendment in matters of national security. 52 As a result, it was clear, The power of the President was reserved by stating: Nothing contained in this chapter or in section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934 shall limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States, or to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities. Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be deemed to limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of the Government by force or other unlawful means, or against any other clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the Government. The contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted by authority of the President in the exercise of the foregoing powers may be received in evidence in any trial hearing, or other proceeding only where such interception was reasonable, and shall not be otherwise used or disclosed except as is necessary to implement that power. 59 S. Rep the first federal law that outlined specific procedure to conduct electronic surveillance of specific crimes. 56 Title III regulated the use of both electronic surveillance and microphone surveillance and criminalized the conduct if done without a warrant. 57 Interestingly, however, section 3 of the Act expressly affirmed the President's constitutional authority to permit electronic surveillance 'to protect the United States'. 58 The DOJ saw Title III as a congressional acceptance of the President's inherent constitutional authority. 59 As such, the Executive Branch adopted five categories where the DOJ allowed warrantless electronic surveillance. 60 The department allowed warrantless surveillance to collect foreign intelligence if it dealt with 1. the protection of the Nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power; 2. obtaining foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States; and 3. protecting the national security information against foreign intelligence activities. Section 2511 (3) certainly confers no power, as the language is wholly inappropriate for such a purpose. It merely provides that the Act shall not be interpreted to limit or disturb such power as the President may have under the Constitution. In short, Congress simply left presidential powers where it found them. 65 Ibid., pp. 321-322 (stating, 'We have not addressed, and express no opinion as to, the issues which may be involved with respect to activities of foreign powers or their agents'). Cir. 1972 ) (upholding the defendant's conviction for willfully refusing to be inducted into the armed forces on the grounds that he was properly denied discovery of the warrantless wiretap because the Attorney General authorized it for the purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence information). 69 United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 603-06 (3 rd Cir. 1974) (holding that the President has the constitutional authority to conduct electronic surveillance for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information on a defendant who was transmitting national defense information to foreign governments).
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The department allowed domestic intelligence surveillance if it dealt with 1. the protection of the United States against overthrow of the government by force or other unlawful means, or 2. against any other clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the government.
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Not surprisingly, four years later, the Supreme Court stepped in to interpret Section 3 of the Act, addressing the issue of electronic surveillance for the last time in United States v. United States District Court (Keith case). 62 The Court, in Keith, held that the President does not have the authority to conduct warrantless surveillance on a person or a group with no significant connection with a foreign power or its agent or agencies. 63 The Court concluded that Section 3 of the Act is not an endorsement of the president's inherent authority, leaving 'presidential power where it found them.' 64 However, the Court limited the reach of its holding only to the domestic aspects of national security, offering no opinion on the issue involving foreign powers or their agents.
65
But it did invite Congress to set standards for electronic surveillance in the context of national security. 
Keith: a start of controversy
Because the Keith Court failed to extend its holding to electronic surveillance related to national security, lower courts began to differ on the issue. Four of the five circuit courts that addressed the issue of electronic surveillance for the purpose of national security sided with the government, recognizing a foreign intelligence exception to the warrant provision of the Fourth Amendment. For example, the Fifth Circuit Court held that warrantless wiretapping, authorized by the attorney general for the purpose of foreign intelligence, that incidentally picked up domestic criminal activity, did not violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. 67 The court reasoned that such deference to the Executive Branch is justified 'because of the President's constitutional duty to act for the United States in the field of foreign relations, and his inherent power to protect national security in the context of foreign affairs'. 68 The Third Circuit also recognized a foreign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement, though it concluded that searches and seizures for national security purposes have to reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 69 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit held that security wiretaps are a recognized exception 
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to the general warrant requirement. 70 And, finally, deciding the case in a pre-FISA context, the Fourth Circuit held that 'because of the need of the executive branch for flexibility, its practical experience, and its constitutional competence, the courts should not require the executive to secure a warrant each time it conducts foreign intelligence surveillance.' 71 But, while the court recognized a foreign intelligence exception to the warrant provision of the Fourth Amendment, it acknowledged that FISA overrode that exception, requiring the President to obtain a warrant before conducting surveillance. 72 However, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals did not recognize presidential authority to conduct warrantless surveillance even before FISA. 73 The Court stated that 'an analysis of the policies implicated by foreign security surveillance indicates that, absent exigent circumstances, all warrantless electronic surveillance is unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional'. abuse of warrantless electronic surveillance Following Keith, while the lower courts continued to disagree on the issue of foreign intelligence surveillance, the Watergate Scandal broke, which revealed that 'warrantless electronic surveillance in the name of national security has been seriously abused' by the Nixon Administration. 75 Senator Frank Church headed a Senate Select Committee, known as the Church Committee, to investigate the government's intelligence activities. 76 The investigation showed a far-reaching infringement of individual privacy. 77 Of particular interest was the FBI's surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King that was entirely unrelated to any legitimate governmental interest. 78 In fact, the Church Committee discovered that Dr. King's hotel room was bugged to obtain purely personal information. 79 The Church Committee pointed out that the inconclusive nature of wiretapping laws was largely the cause of such an expansive abuse and recommended that Congress adopt a statutory framework restricting the Executive Branch's use of wiretaps within the United States. 80 The Church Committee noted:
'Congress and the Supreme Court have both addressed the legal issues raised by electronic surveillance, but the law has been riddled with gaps and exceptions. The Bill requires, for the first time, a prior judicial warrant for all electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence purposes in the United States in which communications of US persons might be intercepted. It clarifies the Executive's authority to gather foreign intelligence by electronic surveillance in the United States. It will remove any doubt about the legality of those surveillances which are conducted to protect our country against espionage and international terrorism. It will assure FBI field agents and others involved in intelligence collection that their acts are authorized by statute and, if a US person's communications are concerned, by a court order. And it will protect the privacy of the American people. In short, the act helps to solidify the relationship of trust between the American people and their Government. It provides a basis for the trust of the American people in the fact that the activities of their intelligence agencies are both effective and lawful. It provides enough secrecy to ensure that intelligence relating to national security can be securely required, while permitting review by the courts and Congress to safeguard the rights of Americans and others. 88 50 USC § 1801 et seq. 89 18 USC §2511 (2)(f) (stating that along with Title III, 'the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance, as defined in section 101 of such Act, and the interception of domestic wire, oral, and electronic communications may be conducted') (emphasis added). 90 50 USC § 1801; 50 USC § 1804 (a). 91 50 USC § 1809 (a). It states:
A person is guilty of an offense if he intentionally--(1) engages in electronic surveillance under color of law except as authorized by statute; or (2) discloses or uses information obtained under color of law by electronic surveillance, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through electronic surveillance not authorized by statute.
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The Senate Judiciary Committee (Committee), therefore, showed its support for legislation to protect national security while preserving civil liberties. 82 It stated that while the Nixon Administration may have surpassed other administrations in conducting improper surveillance, 'the surveillance was by no means atypical'. 83 The Committee pointed out that 'The application of vague and elastic standards for wiretapping and bugging has resulted in electronic surveillances which, by any objective measure, were improper and seriously infringed the Fourth Amendment rights of both the targets and those with whom the targets communicated. The inherently intrusive nature of electronic surveillance, moreover, has enabled the Government to generate vast amounts of information -unrelated to any legitimate government interest -about the personal and political lives of American citizens.'
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As a result, the FISA law was enacted, with strong support from the Executive Branch. 85 The Attorney General at the time stated that the FISA Bill 'sacrifices neither our security nor our civil liberties, and assures that the abuses of the past will remain in the past.'
86 Moreover, President Jimmy Carter showed his support for FISA and recognized that the law would require a 'a prior judicial warrant for all electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence purposes in the United States in which communications of US persons might be intercepted'. 
The FISA framework
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 88 as amended, provides an exclusive framework for the use of electronic surveillance to collect foreign intelligence. 89 It requires the President to obtain a warrant, through a certification that a significant purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence prior to conducting electronic surveillance. 90 Moreover, it criminalizes 'engage[ing] in electronic surveillance under color of law except as authorized by statute'. 91 The law, however, provides three main emergency exceptions to the warrant requirement: 98 Instead of specifying the 'nature and location of each of the facilities or places at which the electronic surveillance will be directed', as was required by the previous law, this change allows new surveillance immediately if the target changes providers in an effort to thwart surveillance. 107 Although the operational details of the programmes are largely unknown, the President has described the NSA activities to be critical to the national security of the country. 108 And the President assured the nation that the programme is properly reviewed every 45 days to ensure that it is being properly used. 109 However, the programme has started a national controversy. Many members of Congress, legal scholars, various organizations, and former government officials have challenged the legality of the programme. 110 A number of terrorism defendants, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Center for Constitutional Rights, and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers have filed legal challenges to the programme. 111 And Senator Russ Feingold, a Democrat from Wisconsin, has announced that he will introduce a Bill to censure the President for breaking the FISA law. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these only, may he be said (for what it may be worth) to personify the federal sovereignty. If his act is held unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually means that the Federal Government as an undivided whole lacks power. A seizure executed by the President pursuant to an Act of Congress would be supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it. 121 Ibid., p. 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). Here, Justice Jackson stated:
When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law. 122 Ibid.
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Analysis
The President lacks the constitutional authority to conduct warrantless wiretapping
The President's inherent authority depends on congressional acts
The DOJ has argued that the President has the constitutional authority, under Article II, 113 to order warrantless domestic surveillance.
114 Citing pre-FISA authority, the DOJ has reasoned that the executive power to conduct foreign and military affairs, including collecting intelligence, has been extensively recognized by the United States Supreme Court. 115 Although the Supreme Court has traditionally deferred to the President in dealing with issues of international affairs, 116 the Court's decisions, cited by the DOJ, are in pre-FISA context. And none of the cited cases have approved warrantless domestic surveillance. 117 Indeed, there has not been a single Supreme Court decision that has ever recognized the President's ability to spy on the American people without a judicial warrant. 118 In fact, the legitimacy of the President's constitutional authority fluctuates, depending on whether Congress has legislated or not.
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Under the three-level framework, set forth by Justice Jackson, the President's authority is at maximum when Congress has expressly or impliedly supported his actions because he is acting pursuant to 'his own right plus all that Congress can delegate'. 120 Whereas, when Congress is silent, the President is relying solely on his own power, and his inherent authority is reduced. 121 Here, the actual test of his power will depend on the importance of events surrounding the situation. 122 However, when the President takes measures contrary to the will of the Congress, 123 Ibid., pp. 637-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson observed: When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject. Any Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system. 124 Ibid., p. 638 (Jackson, J., concurring , J., concurring) . 134 DOJ Jan. 19 Memo, supra note 114, pp. 6-10 (reasoning that interpreting FISA to limit the President's inherent authority will raise constitutional concerns). 135 The Constitution specifically gives Congress the authority to make laws, US CONST. Art. I, including the power to provide for common defence, US CONST. Art. I § 1, declare war, US CONST. Art. I § 8, cl. 11, and to make rules regulating the military, US CONST. Art. II § 1, cl. 14.
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the legitimacy of his power is at its lowest because the power equilibrium, put together by our Constitution, is at stake. 123 Under this category, the President's power will be upheld only if Congress is barred from acting because the President possesses the exclusive authority in the area. 124 And when Congress is not barred and it puts forth 'specific procedures to deal with the type of [war-time] crisis confronting the President, he must follow those procedures in meeting the crisis'. 125 The key lesson of Youngstown is that, although a judge may defer to the President's inherent authority, the decisive factor will be whether the President is following the will of Congress.
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In this case, Congress has not only specifically regulated domestic electronic surveillance, 127 it has criminalized that conduct if not performed according to the procedures set forth by Congress.
128 Besides, the legislative history explains that Congress wanted 'this statute, not any claimed presidential power', to control electronic surveillance 'putting to rest the notion that Congress recognizes an inherent Presidential power to conduct such surveillance in the United States'.
129 Indeed, the congressional conferees intended 'to apply the standard set forth in Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure [Youngstown] case: when the President takes measures incompatible with the express or implied will of Congress, his power is at the lowest ebb ….' 130 Accordingly, any court will review the President's inherent power within the third category of Justice Jackson's framework. In fact, the only court in the nation addressing the issue has characterized the President's power at its weakest, holding the programme unconstitutional. 131 Therefore, the President's authority is not likely to survive because he is relying solely 'upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter '. 132 And because the President, even when acting as Commander-in-Chief, did not 'abide by the specific procedures' of FISA, he has violated the law, as was concluded by the federal court in Michigan.
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Although the Bush Administration has suggested that Congress may not limit the President's inherent authority in this case, 134 congressional acts that touch upon and concern national security are consistent with the constitutional framework. 135 th Memo, supra note 114, pp. 7-8; Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing, supra note 110. The Attorney General told the Senate Judiciary Committee that: Presidents throughout our history have authorized the warrantless surveillance of the enemy during wartime . . . General Washington, for example, instructed his army to intercept letters between British operative, copy them, and then allow those communications to go on their way. President Lincoln used the warrantless wiretapping of telegraph messages during the Civil War to discern the movements and intentions of opposing troops. President Wilson in World War I authorized the military to intercept each and every cable, telephone and telegraph communication going into or out of the United States. During World War II, President Roosevelt instructed the government to use listening devices to learn the plans of spies in the United States. He also gave the military the authority to review, without warrant, all telecommunications, quote, 'passing between the United States and any foreign country.' 146 Youngstown, 343 US, p. 637. 147 Ibid., p. 609 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 74 a role for Congress to regulate domestic surveillance in the context of national security. 136 Moreover, the Court, in Rasul v. Bush, 137 has further discredited the line of reasoning adopted by the Bush Administration. 138 There, the Court rejected the government's argument that applying habeas corpus status to Guantanamo detainees would unconstitutionally interfere with the President's executive power.
139 Furthermore, the Court in Little v. Barreme 140 invalidated a presidential order, implicitly prohibited by Congress, to seize ships coming from France. 141 In fact, the precedent holds that every time Congress has interfered with the President's authority, Congress has prevailed. 142 That is why Congress has regulated the President's war-related authority on many occasions. 143 And if congressional interference with the President's foreign affairs authority is unconstitutional, all those statutes would be unconstitutional. Therefore, the President's authority is not exclusive, and Congress is not barred from legislating. If anything, the President is acting in a sharper contrast with the will of Congress here than the President in Youngstown or Barreme because in those two cases Congress had merely failed to give President the authority to act. 144 Whereas here, Congress has affirmatively placed specific procedures to be followed -even during war time.
Previous Presidents' interception of communication is irrelevant post-FISA
To lend more support to the President's exclusive constitutional authority to conduct electronic surveillance, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales has argued that previous presidents, including Washington, Lincoln, Roosevelt, and Truman, have authorized warrantless interception of communications. 145 However, that argument is largely irrelevant because the passage of FISA, in 1978, has diminished the President's authority to the third category of Justice Jackson's threelevel framework.
146 FISA restricted the President's power to collect domestic intelligence, and finding 'authority so explicitly withheld [by Congress] is not merely to disregard in a particular instance the clear will of Congress. It is to disrespect the whole legislative process and the constitutional division of authority between President and Congress'.
147 Therefore, post-FISA presidents do not have the same type of authority that pre-FISA presidents had. In fact, since the passage of FISA, presidents can no longer legally wiretap outside of the procedures set-forth by Congress. Reading the 'use all necessary and appropriate force' provision broadly, the Bush Administration has construed the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) to mean that the executive branch is free to conduct domestic wiretapping without obtaining a warrant from the FISA Court. 150 Relying heavily on Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 151 the Administration has reasoned that AUMF supplements FISA in the same way that it supplemented the Non-Detention Act. 152 In that case, Yaser Hamdi, an American citizen, was captured in Afghanistan during the United States military action against the Taliban regime. 153 He was transferred to the United States and was classified as an enemy combatant, receiving no due process. 154 The government argued that Congress has authorized Hamdi's detention through the AUMF. 155 The Court agreed, concluding that '[b]ecause detention to prevent a combatant's return to the battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging war, in permitting the use of "necessary and appropriate force", Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized detention in the narrow circumstances considered here'.
156 Similarly, notwithstanding FISA, the Administration has asserted that Congress has also authorized the President, through AUMF, to permit electronic surveillance of Americans. 157 However, recently, the Supreme Court, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 158 expressly rejected this very argument by the government. There, the President argued that the AUMF implicitly allows the President to convene military commissions to try those captured in the war on terrorism. 159 The Court stated that, although AUMF activated the President's war powers, nothing in the text or legislative history alters the procedure to establish military commissions under Article 21 of the 160 Ibid., p. 2775. 161 Ibid. 162 Ibid. (stating that the Administration's position assumes 'that the power to conduct electronic surveillance for intelligence purposes is an essential aspect of the use of military force in the same way that the capture of enemy combatants on the battlefield is a necessary incident to the conduct of military operations'). And I would suggest that the Court's holding is reasonable because if AUMF allows the president to kill enemy combatants on the battlefield in Afghanistan, he ought to be able to detain those he captures there. However, the same rationale cannot be applied to wiretapping Americans at home. Moreover, the Administration's reliance on Hamdi assumes that wiretapping Americans, within the United States, is an incident of waging war, similar to detaining enemy combatants that are captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan. 162 However, the Court has a narrow view of what 'incidents of waging war', are under AUMF, by concluding that 'detention of individuals falling into the limited category we are considering, for the duration of the particular conflict in which they were captured, is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the "necessary and appropriate force" Congress has authorized the President to use'. 163 Furthermore, the Court clarified that its holding is limited to enemy combatants fighting in Afghanistan by stating that 'for purposes of this case, the 'enemy combatant' that it is seeking to detain is an individual who, it alleges, was 'part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners' in Afghanistan and who 'engaged in an armed conflict against the United States' there . . . We therefore answer only the narrow question before us: whether the detention of citizens falling within that definition is authorized.'
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And the Court rejected the government's assertion to let the Commander-in-Chief deal with enemy combatants as he sees fit -precisely the kind of argument made by the Bush Administration now -stating that a 'state of war is not a blank check for the president when it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens'. 165 Therefore, the Court has a far more limited reading of AUMF than the one put forward by the DOJ. Moreover, the Administration's argument suggests that AUMF triumphs over FISA. 166 But AUMF contains no language referring to electronic surveillance, while FISA has been carefully drafted to regulate domestic wiretapping after years of debate. 167 And when there is a statutory conflict, specific statutes prevail over general statutes. 168 Therefore, the Administration's argument fails for two reasons: One, there is no statutory conflict because only FISA is a wiretapping statute. Two, even if AUMF is construed to have impliedly authorized wiretapping, thereby, creating a statutory conflict, the case-law clearly shows that FISA will prevail over AUMF. Similarly, the case-law is also clear that Congress 'does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions--it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouse holes'. 169 In fact, the only court addressing this issue has expressly rejected this assertion, holding that AUMF does not alter or modify FISA. 170 There, the court concluded 'giving this president or any other president the ability to go around FISA carte blanche'. 185 Calling the attorney general's rationale dangerous, Senator Graham stated that the Administration's line of reasoning 'may make it harder for the next president to get a force resolution if we take this [argument] too far'. 186 And it is risky to go along with the president's rationale when the war on terrorism, like the Cold War, can last for decades, allowing him to conduct warrantless wiretapping for as long without any checks. 187 Moreover, the President's statutory argument seems to carry little weight with some members of his own administration. 188 The attorney general himself has acknowledged that lawyers, within the Justice Department, dissented with the idea that AUMF is a sufficient authority to circumvent the procedures set forth by FISA. 189 And although the Justice Department has denied the allegation, Deputy Attorney General James Comey appears to have acknowledged that AUMF, as an authority to wiretap without a warrant from the FISA court, 'had grown stale '. 190 Therefore, it is not logical to conclude that AUMF, a resolution that does not mention electronic surveillance even once, can substitute the specific language of FISA and repeal 18 USC § 2511 (2)(f), especially in the absence of congressional intent to do so. To conclude otherwise would mean that Congress intended AUMF to implicitly allow spying on Americans, not involved in combat, on domestic soil, notwithstanding FISA or 18 USC § 2511, under fewer restrictions than when a formal war is declared. 192 therefore, 'the President made the determination that FISA is not always sufficient'. 193 That argument does not hold because FISA contains emergency provisions that provide speed and agility. The Act allows that 'the President, through the attorney general, may authorize electronic surveillance without a court order under this subchapter to acquire foreign intelligence information for periods of up to one year' if it is directed towards foreign persons or property. 194 Another emergency provision permits the attorney general to 'authorize the emergency employment of electronic surveillance' without a warrant and request a warrant as soon as possible but not more than 72 hours (3 days) after the surveillance has been authorized. 195 And when Congress has declared a war, the attorney general is allowed to conduct warrantless domestic surveillance for up to 15 days. 196 Moreover, the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) itself has been very willing to grant warrants, issuing all but 6 of the 20,000 requests made by the government. 197 Therefore, contrary to the DOJ's assertion, FISA provides the President with the necessary tools to respond to the changing threat in an effective and efficient manner. 198 Besides, if FISA is truly inadequate to meet the needs of the Executive Branch to protect the nation against terrorism, the President could have asked Congress to amend the law, rather than circumventing the legal framework put in place by Congress. Although the attorney general has argued that FISA could not be amended without compromising the secrecy of the programme, 199 Congress has amended FISA five times since September 11, 2001, 'to give it more flexibility' without compromising its secrecy or effectiveness. 
Lack of judicial oversight leads to abuse
The express language of the Constitution gives Congress the power to make laws. 201 Similarly, the President is required to ensure that laws, including FISA, are 'faithfully executed'. 202 And the role of the judiciary is to serve as impartial magistrates, interpreting our laws. 203 By creating three separate, yet interdependent, branches of government, the framers wanted to make sure that power does not concentrate in the hands of a few. 204 Particularly, when individual liberties are at stake, the Constitution 'most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches'. 205 And it is due to the 'separation of powers and division of functions among the different branches and levels of Government' that individual freedoms are preserved. 206 Therefore, the 'Fourth Amendment does not contemplate the executive officers of Government as neutral and disinterested magistrates' 207 because the framers understood that 'executive discretion may yield too readily to pressures to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook potential invasions of privacy and protected speech'. 208 FISA was formulated precisely to protect civil liberties from executive abuse, without compromising national security. 209 The legislative history points out that unchecked wiretapping had allowed the President to collect information, unrelated to national security, 'about the personal and political lives of American citizens'. 210 Once again, as far as we know, this exceeding executive power has allowed the President to spy on political, environmental, animal rights, antiwar, and faith-based groups. 211 As a result, the President's marginalization of the judiciary and Congress is not only contrary to the constitutional framework, it raises serious concerns over abuse of his unchecked power.
Conclusion
In summary, the President's inherent constitutional power to wiretap has been diminished because Congress has specifically regulated electronic surveillance. 212 And because Congress has laid down specific procedures, the President is required to follow them, even in times of war. 213 Moreover, AUMF cannot legally be interpreted to authorize unlimited electronic surveillance. It is a general statute that authorizes the use of force against al Qaeda and the Taliban regime. 214 And it neither expressly nor impliedly allows the President to unilaterally determine who he wants to wiretap. 215 On the other hand, FISA expressly and exclusively 216 provides specific guidelines for the use of electronic surveillance to collect foreign intelligence inside the United States.
217 So, even if AUMF is construed to have included communications interception inside the United States, the specificity of FISA language prevails over the generality of AUMF. 218 Additionally, when the President acts as 'the prosecutor and disinterested, neutral magistrate', subject neither to congressional review nor courts' scrutiny, it not only violates the constitutional equilibrium of power but also leads to abuse. After all, it was the presidential abuse of electronic surveillance that gave birth to FISA. 219 Finally, the flexibility of FISA and the willingness of the FISA court to serve as a rubber stamp for the Executive Branch further diminish the need for such blatant invasion of our private conversations. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that any court will uphold the legality of the NSA programme. Given these reasons, it is important for the President to immediately cease the warrantless NSA activities, abide by the limitation of FISA, and respect the constitutional checks and balances. If the President believes that FISA cannot adequately respond to the changing nature of threat that our nation faces, he must seek to amend the law and not violate it. Similarly, Congress must make it clear that AUMF is not a wiretapping statute that implicitly supplements FISA. Additionally, Congress must take its oversight role seriously and launch a comprehensive investigation to better understand the facts and scope of the programme. Only after a thorough review can Congress hold the President accountable, create a better oversight to ensure that such abuse of power is not repeated, and recommend any needed amendments to FISA.
